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Reconfiguration Auctions

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This is an informative document and does not replace the regulation issued by the CREG.

The Contingency Mechanisms
Reconfiguration Auctions



In the previous types of Contingency Mechanisms, the initiative to use these different alternatives comes from the generator and the cost of these transactions is borne by the generator and can not be transferred to the users.

In the reconfiguration auctions, it is the CREG (on behalf of the users of the SIN), which determines the necessity to employ these mechanisms when it detects after the Auctions to Allocate the OEFs have already been executed that for a particular year there will be an excess or deficit of firm energy.

Based on the latest energy demand projections for the year t, the CREG will evaluate in years t-2 and t-1 if the OEF allocated for t are sufficient to cover the demand for that year. If the CREG considers it necessary to adjust the OEF allocations, it will announce the implementation date of a reconfiguration auction to purchase (if it is a deficit situation) or a reconfiguration auction to sell (if it is an OEF surplus situation).

These reconfiguration auctions have a more simple operation than the Auction for the Allocation of OEF. In the case of the reconfiguration auction to purchase, each generator that has an ENFICC sends a sealed envelope containing the information on the firm energy quantity it is willing to sell and the minimum price that it expects to receive for this energy. The auctioneer selects from among these offers the most economic (or lowest) price bids to cover the deficit of firm energy calculated by the CREG.

If it is a reconfiguration auction to sell, each generator wishing to reduce its OEF sends a sealed envelope indicating the quantity of ENFICC that it wants to reduce and the maximum price it is willing to pay for this reduction. The auctioneer selects the generators with the highest price offers to eliminate or reduce their OEFs.

The resulting prices from these reconfiguration auctions, unlike in the other Contingency Mechanisms, are borne by the users of the SIN.